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Abstract  
This thesis examines the potential impact of community oriented policing in Latin 
America through a series of case studies from Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and El 
Salvador dating from the early 1990’s to the present.  They are analyzed through a 
typology that organizes community oriented policing strategies according to costliness to 
the police.  Costliness is defined as the amount of power that the police have to renounce 
to the community to implement a certain strategy.  The thesis concludes that community 
oriented policing is an improvement over militarized policing strategies as it has the 
possibility to enhance both human security and state legitimacy in the region.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 Every state in the world currently has a police force of some sort to, 
theoretically, enforce laws and regulate society.  A more specific definition of the 
police is, according to David Bayley, that they are, “people authorized by a group to 
regulate interpersonal relations within the group through application of physical 
force.”1  Another definition, from Diamint says that they are, “a state’s apparatus to 
regulate the daily acts of citizens, ensure order, and organize and implement 
procedures for law enforcement…They are lawfully authorized to use force to 
guarantee order and respect for the law.”2   
As demonstrated with the definitions above, the legitimate application of the 
use of force is key to defining the police’s role.  This remains an issue in many parts 
of the world where police continue to apply force illegally, for example through 
torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.  In a democratic society in 
particular the abuse of force is generally considered unacceptable.  This may cause 
one to ask something which scholars have wrestled with for a long time, namely, 
what is a democracy and a democratic society?  Although answering this question is 
outside the scope of this paper, one useful definition is that a democracy exists when  
                                                
1 John Bailey and Lucia Dammert eds. Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas. Pittsburgh, 
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006. 19 
 
2Jorge Dominguez and Anthony Jones eds. The Construction of Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2007. 149  
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formal institutions operate and when basic civil, political, and legal rights for the 
institutions’ operation are extended to the general population.3   Extending these 
rights to the general population always includes some form of political elections (a 
government with elections is frequently called a “polyarchy”) and freedom of 
expression.4  The definition also usually includes respect for the “rule of law,” which 
means that every person has access to certain rights under the law, and to enforceable 
judicial provisions if these rights are abrogated.5  In addition, the state should be 
accountable to its citizens, which means that the people should be able to hold elected 
officials and government institutions responsible for transgressions they may 
commit.6 
Though these rights and the definition of the role of the state have changed 
and evolved over time, one of the fundamental roles of the state is the provision of 
security.    Security is the foundation for the modern state system because people 
initially came together in towns or villages for protection (and commerce).  The 
security in villages also enabled the growth of trade.  In current times, the police 
typically provide domestic security and the definition of security has expanded to 
                                                
3 Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel Goldstein. Violent Democracies in Latin America. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2010., 3  
 
4 Guillermo O’Donnell. "Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America." Latin American 
Studies Association. (1998). http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA98/O'Donnell.pdf (accessed June 12, 
2013). 
 
5 Ibid  
 
6 Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead eds. Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to 
Democracy in Latin America. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009., 9 
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“human security,” which purports to explain how persons in a nation should be able 
to live.  Human security is defined as, “the freedom of individuals and communities 
from threats posed by conflict and violence to their physical, social or cultural 
integrity or survival.”7  This definition clarifies that people in a state should 
theoretically be free from violence from both non-governmental actors and from the 
state itself.  Therefore one could say that if a state fails to provide security for its 
people, and particularly if the people suffer from elevated levels of violence, then the 
state is not a democracy.   
Because of the elevated levels of violence throughout Latin America, most 
scholars agree that while the majority of the region (excluding Cuba) has democratic 
governments they are, “far from perfect.”8 Guillermo O’Donnell says that most Latin 
American countries are, “third stage” democracies, which means that while the 
majority of states have competitive elections and freedom of expression, they still 
lack the ability to enforce the rule of law because of weak criminal justice branches 
and widespread corruption.9   Consequently, professionalizing and democratizing 
police forces (and other aspects of the criminal justice system such as the judiciary 
and the penitential system) is key to encouraging democratic growth and citizen 
security in the region.  Because of this many reform attempts have been made thus 
                                                
7 Kees Koonings and Dirk Krujit. Fractured Cities. New York, NY: Zed Books, 2007., 13  
 
8 Arias and Goldstein, 3  
 
9 Lucia Dammert. "Reforma Policial en America Latina." Seguridad Ciudadana. (2005). 
http://dspace.uah.es/dspace/bitstream/handle/10017/7794/reforma_dammert_QUORUM_2005.pdf?seq
uence=1 (accessed June 12, 2013). 56  
 
 4 
far.  Democratic policing has a different definition than the earlier policing 
definitions, it includes, accountability to the law and not to itself, accountability to 
democratic structures and the community, transparency, professionalism, and being 
representative of the community it serves.10   
This sort of policing remains elusive throughout Latin America, and indicators 
for state and non-state violence show “persistent human rights violations, an increase 
in homicides and domestic conflict…some countries also continue to use torture.”11  
This occurs in areas that actually have police and state presence; in some nations 
there are “governance voids,” where the state, and police, are virtually nonexistent.  
One example are the guerrilla and/or paramilitary controlled regions in Colombia.  
Other examples are the many shantytowns surrounding major Latin American cities 
that are controlled by gangs and lack government presence.12   
When the police do enter these areas they typically enter in a heavily armed 
and aggressive manner, which frequently leads to human rights abuses and the 
murder of innocent civilians.  Because of this, entire segments of the population fear 
the police, and in many parts of Latin America the people see them as a, “source of 
crime rather than guarantor of civil rights.”13  If the police are the only contact with 
the state, then the people will fear the state as well.  Using the police as a proxy for 
                                                
10 Sankar Sen. Enforcing Police Accountability through Civilian Oversight. Los Angeles: SAGE, 
2010., 9  
 
11 Arias and Goldstein, 236  
 
12 Koonings and Krujit, 13  
 
13 Dominguez and Jones, 160  
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democracy in a country is frequently used by scholars precisely because they are the 
part of the state which people have most contact with on a regular basis, and so a 
legitimate police force is key to both crime reduction and ensuring state legitimacy.14 
As discussed earlier, the police are legally permitted to use violence under 
certain circumstances; however, throughout Latin America the illegal use of police 
violence is frequent.  Arias and Goldstein define the illegal use of state violence as, 
“disproportionate use of force to suppress opposition, create a state of fear and 
exercise state terror.”15  Examples of this can include extrajudicial killings, torture, 
and other forms of coercive violence.  According to Fruhling, the poor tend to suffer 
“disproportionately,” from police abuses.  He says that this is partially because there 
is an underlying acceptance of institutional violence in Latin America, because police 
attitudes favor the wealthy, and because there are inadequate civilian controls over 
the police; this last issue has lead to widespread impunity because the police know 
that they can get away with committing crimes.16  Dammert concurs that the police in 
Latin America do not respond to all members of society equally and that their actions 
are conditioned by perceived socioeconomic differences.17    
One of the most common responses by the state to the crime increase has been 
Mano Dura (strong-arm) policing.  This typically entails mass arrests and increased 
                                                
14 Dammert (2005), 54 
 
15 Arias and Goldstein, 229  
 
16 Joseph Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg. Toward a Society Under Law. Washington D.C.: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2006., 19  
 
17 Dammert (2005), 55  
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police abuses and is, “likely to accentuate the climate of violence and distrust.”18  
These policies are usually initially supported and initiated by the community because 
a spike in crime often leads to the election of politicians who promise to take a strong 
stance against it.   
One of the best examples of Mano Dura policing occurred in El Salvador, 
where the government passed laws during the 2000’s (Mano Dura Part I in 2003 and 
Mano Dura Part II in 2008) legitimizing the arrest of anyone who looked like they 
might belong to a gang while increasing the amount of time people could be 
incarcerated without trial.  These policies led to an increase in the prison, and gang, 
populations, and failed to decrease violence and illicit activities.  Prisons have been 
called, “finishing schools” for gang members precisely because imprisoned gang 
members have the opportunity to make contacts and learn from more experienced 
gang members.19   This means that all these policies created were the largest prison 
populations in the Americas and more gang members.  These laws eventually further 
contributed to the lack of trust between the police and the community, as people 
started to see relatives, friends and neighbors arrested indiscriminately.   
In addition to current police abuses, many nations in Latin America have a 
long history of repressive governments, frequently through either military juntas or 
right-wing dictatorships.  Throughout the region these systems of government were 
dismantled during the 1980’s and 1990’s, which means that the memory of the police 
acting as a repressive state agent, causing disappearances, and torturing remains 
                                                
18 Bergman and Whitehead, 13  
 
19 Cynthia Arnson ed.  “In the Wake of War.” Woodrow Wilson Press, 2012. pp. 317-341. 
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present among the population.  Of the nations that will be discussed later in the case 
studies, Chile had a right-wing dictatorship from1973-1990, El Salvador had one (in a 
long line of autocratic dictatorships) from 1979-1992 which ended after a bloody civil 
war and Brazil had a military junta from 1964-1985.  In each of these nations the 
police was used as an element of repression and was frequently a military branch, in 
other words the domestic police was controlled by and lead by members of the 
military.   
This history explains why the boundary between domestic security, which 
should be provided by the police, and international security, which should be 
provided by the military, is often blurred in Latin America with the military taking a 
wide role in areas which are considered part of the police’s purview in most other 
nations.  An excellent example of this is the military’s role in the war against the 
TCO’s (transnational criminal organizations) in Mexico.  Arias and Goldstein also 
note that the police in many Latin American countries is still called the policia militar 
(military police).  The military police was usually left untouched after the 
democratization process; this occurred in both Brazil and Chile.20  As will be 
discussed further in the case study chapter, the police in these nations retained their 
hierarchical structure, militaristic nature, and minimal civilian government oversight.   
As mentioned earlier, crime and corruption are serious issues in Latin 
America, and demonstrate the weakness of the state and the police.  The whole region 
experienced a major crime wave, which began after the fall of most of the regions 
                                                
20 Arias and Goldstein, 238  
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dictatorships in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.  Homicides rose 41% between 1998 
and 2008, and in some countries the level of violent, and non-violent crime, remains 
noticeably elevated to this day.21  In addition to crime, Bailey and Dammert identify 
other threats to public security in Latin America including, “violence, terrorism and 
domestic institutions characterized by incompetence, corruption and impunity.”22   
2011 data shows that Latin America is the most violent region in the world, 
with homicide rates twice the world average; 25% of these homicides are believed to 
be TCO or gang related.23   In addition, the region has the most “most dangerous 
cities,” in the world, including all of the cities in the top twenty of the ranking.24   
When studying crime and violence in Latin America, one must bear in mind that 
some Latin American countries remain the main producers and transporters for plant 
based (and other) narcotics for the world.  The financial gains from U.S. and 
European drug consumption has helped fuel illicit groups and consequently violence 
in the region.   
According to Arias and Goldstein, the frequency of crime, and of violent 
crime especially, “concretely affect[s] lived political experience[s]”25 in Latin 
                                                
21 Bergman and Whitehead, 93-94  
 
22 Bailey and Dammert, 11  
 
23 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Global Study on Homicide ." Last modified 2011. 
Accessed June 12, 2013. http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf. 
 
24 Joshua Berlinger. "The 50 Most Dangerous Cities in the World." Business Insider, 10 9, 2012. 
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-dangerous-cities-in-the-world-2012-10?op=1 (accessed June 12, 
2013). 
 
25 Arias and Goldstein, 4  
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America, hence most voters rank crime of equal importance as the economy when 
polls are taken.  Unger concurs with Arias and Goldstein and says that crime 
“corrodes,” everyday life in Latin America.26  For example, he notes that in many 
places people are afraid to go out at night because of how common crime is, and says 
that this reduces the sense of community among people.  He says that crime has also 
permeated power relations between state and society, enhanced geographic 
differences among regions and damaged civil society.27  He finds that violence has 
allowed the state to take on more powers, and that it frequently uses violence and 
crime as justification for repressive anti-crime policies.  Corruption, or at least the 
perception of corruption, also remains problematic throughout most nations in Latin 
America at all levels of government, from local police at the bottom all the way up to 
ministers in major federal agencies.28  Like crime, this can damage the social fabric 
and further reduce the people’s trust in their government. 
The graph below illustrates the per capita homicide rates for the nations which 
will be discussed later in the case study section.  In all countries, excepting Brazil and 
Chile, a clear spike in violence is noticeable (note that there is also more limited data 
for these two nations).  Although these two countries did not register spikes, many 
Brazilian cities did individually, and in Chile there was an elevated perception of 
insecurity during the 1990’s after the government democratized.  The perception of 
                                                                                                                                      
 
26 Mark Unger. Policing Democracy. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011., 71  
 
27 Ibid  
 
28 Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2012." Last modified 2012. Accessed 
June 12, 2013. http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/.  
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insecurity can be almost as damaging as insecurity itself, because people regardless 
perceive the state as having less control over crime.  Likewise, the perception of 
increased security, even if it is not immediately apparent in data, can greatly help the 
state (and politicians) because the people think that the situation is improving. 
 
 
29  
A note on data collection in Latin America, and the data used throughout this 
paper, should be made.  Throughout Latin America there is a “dearth of data” 
regarding crime, although there has been an improvement in the past twenty years.30  
The most reliable estimate for general crime frequently comes from the homicide rate 
because it has been tracked most often throughout the region; the homicide rates do 
clearly show that the region has the world’s highest per capita homicide rates outside 
                                                
29 Graph shows per capita homicides, the data from the UNODC, the graph is the authors own  
 
30 Bergman and Whitehead, 3-4  
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of war zones.31  The lack of data can be attributed to many sources, including police 
and government corruption and incompetence.   
An additional issue is that government agencies within nations, and 
international organizations such as the UNODC, IADB, and Interpol all report 
differently and show different data; Unger says that this is a problem throughout the 
region even in nations such as Costa Rica, Chile and Uruguay which generally have 
better crime statistics than the rest of Latin America.32  Within countries, homicides 
are also typically classified as intentional or unintentional and only the intentional 
homicides are reported to international agencies; this is an area where the numbers 
can easily be altered, and where, more innocently, countries can simply use different 
metrics.  In Mexico specifically they have even started breaking down intentional 
homicides as between those thought to be caused by TCO’s and those unrelated to 
TCO’s; this has recently come under some scrutiny and led to controversy because it 
appears that the new Pena Nieto administration is intentionally moving some of the 
homicides thought to be caused by TCO’s into the unrelated category.33 
Recently, some countries, and independent organizations such as the 
LatinoBarometro and the Latin American Public Opinion Project through Vanderbilt 
University, have started conducting victimization studies which conduct public 
                                                
31 Bailey and Dammert, 7-8  
 
32 Unger, 49  
 
33 Alejandro Hope. Mexico's Violent Crime Numbers Don't Add Up, "InSight Crime." Last modified 
04 24, 2013. Accessed June 12, 2013. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/mexico-violent-
crime-numbers-add-up.  
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opinion polls to discover how many people have experienced crime and what kind, 
how many have experienced corruption and by which part of the government, what 
crimes people are most concerned about, etc., and this has expanded the available 
data somewhat.34  Although these polls cannot answer all the questions or cover all 
facets of society, one of the major findings has been that on average people in Latin 
America only report between 25% and 30% of crimes to the authorities because they 
distrust the police, and regardless do not believe that the police is capable of solving 
the crimes.35  This unreported crime is frequently referred to as the cifra negra (black 
number) in Latin America, and the percentage of unreported crime is frequently 
debated in both the media and in the political arena.  For example, official 
government numbers may give one estimate whereas independent sources will give 
another.  This adds to the overall unreliability of data and demonstrates the great 
distrust with which most people view the police.   
As discussed above, most of Latin America suffers from elevated crime rates 
and poor policing.  This poor policing reflects on the state itself and on democracy in 
the region because a nation is not fully democratic until most of its citizens believe 
that they can rely on their state to provide security, and as of right now many Latin 
American states are not succeeding in this area.  The police are clearly important to 
improving security because they are traditionally the main providers of domestic 
                                                
34 Vanderbilt University, "Latin American Public Opinion Project." Accessed June 12, 2013. 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/.  
 
35 Bailey and Dammert, 9  
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security, and because their physical presence is evidence of state presence and their 
actions can be taken to represent the state.  
 Because of the police’s importance to a state, and their weakness and 
corruption in Latin America, I thought that exploring alternative forms of policing in 
Latin America could be a useful study, and one of the most frequently discussed types 
of “good” or “democratic” policing is community oriented policing.  This thesis aims 
to explore community oriented policing as a way to improve human security and state 
legitimacy in the region.  In the next chapter, I will attempt to define and create a 
typology of community oriented policing because this form of policing lacks a formal 
definition and because the term is frequently used without explanation, and will 
discuss concerns with the model.  After this I will include a chapter with case studies 
from Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and El Salvador; these case studies illustrate 
various attempts at community oriented policing from the national to the local level.  
I will subsequently try to fit these cases into my typology to analyze whether or not 
any of them achieve community oriented policing.  Lastly, I will conclude by 
analyzing whether or not community oriented policing is the best option for police 
reform given the information in this thesis.   
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Chapter Two: What is Community Oriented Policing? 
 
 
 Community oriented policing is, in the words of Hugo Fruhling, “quite 
popular.”36 Wisler and Onwudiwe concur and say that it has, “become the almost 
unchallenged definition of good and democratic policing…it is the ideological and 
policy model espoused in mission statements, police goals, and reform programs by 
practically all policing forces.”37 Although, as these quotes demonstrate, it is 
generally agreed that community oriented policing is very popular, it lacks an official 
definition.  Instead, many scholars, governments, and police services have attempted 
to define community oriented policing independently.  To give a sampling of the 
breadth of definitions a few are listed below. 
Unger defines it as “a preventive approach based on making society the first 
line of defense against crime and insecurity,”38 whereas Sen refers to it as 
“arrangements in policing that accord a significant role to the community in defining 
                                                
36 Hugo Fruhling. "A realistic look at Latin American Community Policing Programs ." Policing and 
Society. (2011). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2011.636816 (accessed June 19, 2013)., 76 
 
37 Dominique Wisler, and Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe. Community Policing International Patterns and 
Comparative Perspectives. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009. Vii 
 
38 Unger, 9-10 
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and guiding policing in their localities.”39  Dominguez and Jones expand further and 
define it as, “more than merely controlling law and order and fighting crime.  It  
responds to new management criteria in public administration (economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness) and legitimizes the presence of the police in the urban arena.”40   
Other authors do not define it specifically and instead explain how it has been 
implemented in North America and Europe, which is where the model has its roots.  
For example Fruhling says that it should: (1) emphasize preventive action in the 
neighborhood (2) promote the establishment of close ties with the community to 
promote feedback  (3) the police should try to mobilize the community to take 
preventive actions and (4) police actions should reflect knowledge of about 
conditions and circumstances that are conducive to crime.41    
Although community oriented policing (COP) lacks a consensual model, there 
are common themes throughout the definitions.  For example, all the definitions say 
that it entails greater involvement with the community.  This in turn should 
theoretically reduce police violence, because the police become familiar with the 
community and vice versa which means that they lose both some of their impunity 
and form relationships with the people.   These relationships in turn should enable the 
police to prevent crime through better intelligence.  Throughout the definitions and 
discussions on community oriented policing the formation of trusting bonds between 
the police and the community is key to success.  In addition, COP is proactive instead 
                                                
39 Sen, 30  
 
40 Dominguez and Jones, 164  
 
41 Wisler and Onwudiwe, 292  
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of reactive policing because it focuses on crime prevention.  Preventing crime and 
reducing police violence and corruption, which a solid community policing program 
should achieve, are attractive goals for politicians in parts of the world such as Latin 
America where violence and corruption are key political and human security issues.  
This explains why there has been a growth in community policing programs since the 
1990’s throughout the region.   
Virtually all countries now claim that their police take into consideration the 
needs of the community and accept that they must work with the community to solve 
crime successfully, partially because, as mentioned earlier, community oriented 
policing is now “synonymous” with good and democratic policing.  In the next 
section I will be presenting a series of case studies from Brazil, Mexico, El Salvador, 
Chile and Colombia where community policing has been attempted at many levels, 
from the municipal or state-wide to the federal.   Before presenting the case studies, I 
have attempted to create a typology of community oriented policing as it is found in 
Latin America so as to better organize the case studies and analyze why or why not 
the programs succeeded.   
According to Fruhling, police reform can be divided into two types, “Genuine 
efforts that seek to transform the police force versus efforts that seek to merely 
project a better image of the police.”42  However, it seems to me that one can find 
three types of police reform when looking specifically at community oriented 
policing programs.  I discuss them in descending order from least to most costly for 
the police below, the more community involvement the program entails the more 
                                                
42 Frühling, December 2011, 79 
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costly it is to the police because community involvement requires the police to 
voluntarily renounce a portion of their power and give it to the community (or to 
other government agencies, civil society groups, etc.) 
The first type is when policing services supposedly implement “community 
policing” while barely utilizing community oriented policing strategies.  In this type, 
police services and governments use COP as a public relations strategy to make their 
police services appear more democratic and open.  As discussed earlier, virtually all 
governments and police services now say that they involve the community in their 
programs; however, many do not actually involve the community.  I include creating 
community councils and then either ignoring them or dismantling them after one or 
two meetings in this section because they are a way for the government to claim that 
they are involving the community without actually doing so.  Another low-cost 
mechanism could be installing a complaints and concerns email or box, which can 
then be ignored.   
The second type is divided into two groups of community oriented policing 
programs, between programs that are more or less costly for the police. 
The less costly programs generally entail programs that the police can take 
without actually involving the community.  One example is block-by-block policing 
(also called “sector” and “quadrant” policing).   Although this may be effective 
because it enables the police to get to know the area and the people, it does not 
usually involve the community in its design and implementation.  Another example is 
implementing a crime-mapping program.  Although this may help the police identify 
 18 
crime hot spots and enable prevention, it likewise requires minimal community 
involvement.  Many crime-mapping programs are run through universities or non-
profits, and so they do require the police to interact with members of the community 
but only with a limited amount of people.   Another example is programs at youth 
centers and in schools, this may allow for greater community engagement; however, 
if the police are just lecturing young people it does not require them to interact with 
them and hear their input.  One excellent example of this was the DARE program in 
the U.S., which was widespread and eventually largely dismissed as a failed program 
because of how few young people it apparently influenced.   
A few common programs could be ranked under either the less or more costly 
section depending on the specific case.  For example, community councils, which are 
one of the most frequently and rapidly implemented community-policing like 
strategies, could be costly if the police genuinely take the citizens complaints and 
suggestions and try to act upon them, or they can be a forum for people to vent their 
frustration without the police having to do anything.  Many are also started and then 
stopped because of lack of commitment from either the police or the community 
members sitting on the council.  Another example of this could be neighborhood 
watch groups and phone trees because the police could help set these up, and then 
ignore their recommendations or fail to continue supporting them.  These are also 
problematic because some people view them as the state trying to pass its 
responsibility for providing security onto the community. Another case-dependent 
example is creating a citizens complaint channel, as mentioned in the first section, 
 19 
because this could enable greater community involvement or the complaints could be 
ignored.  A final case-dependent example is maintaining the same police in an area 
during block policing.  Although this decision can be taken by the police without 
community input it can be costly because it removes some scheduling power from 
higher-ranking officers in the chain of command and means that manpower is 
theoretically committed to a certain area, which means that they can’t transfer officers 
or place them on temporary details. 
The programs I identify as even more costly require greater community 
engagement and the police giving up more of their power.  These may include 
engaging the people in strategy formation, for example the police could consult with 
the community about how best to tackle a specific problem, such as street level drug 
sales, through a community council or some other mechanism.  More costly strategies 
also include greater social components, for example when police work with social 
workers, teachers etc. to develop programs.  All of these should make the police more 
aware of the communities “needs and interests” and force them to start focusing on 
the concrete issues that have the greatest impact on the communities.43  
 Another very costly step is actually developing and publishing clear indicators of 
police effectiveness and evaluation mechanisms because this means that the police 
can be judged.  Interestingly, the evaluation stage is the one most frequently forgotten 
in Latin American police reform programs, perhaps because governments do not want 
to publicize that their efforts failed.  This also requires community engagement 
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because it typically requires victimization surveys to be performed by unbiased 
outside actors.  Once these are published the police can be called to account for their 
actions by the government, society, and the media in addition to the international 
community.  Another costly step is municipal government and community 
involvement from the beginning of a programs design, because it means that outside 
actors have oversight and insight into the program from the start.   
Other costly steps need to take place within the government and police structure.  
They can include, for example, giving greater autonomy to local police chiefs to 
enable them to make better decisions for their community.  This replaces the existing 
hierarchical system, and is extremely costly to the central police and state, because it 
will probably engender resistance among higher-ranking officers.  Giving greater 
discretion to local chiefs and lower-ranking police officers, or decentralizing the 
police command system, is one of the major obstacles to police reform encountered 
throughout Latin America.  Another major obstacle is enhancing oversight over the 
police, this should happen at both the community and the government level, and once 
oversight is established mechanisms to curb abuse should be implemented.   
Most nations in Latin America (excluding Chile) now have an ombudsmans 
office, which is supposed to investigate citizen complaints and abuses and 
subsequently enable perpetrators prosecution.  These were largely created to help 
protect human and civil rights from abuse by the government, and in many cases, 
from the police or the military in particular.  Unfortunately these offices are 
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frequently understaffed, overworked, and lack real power and so other mechanisms 
for monitoring the police should be implemented.   
Another costly step for all governments is inter-agency coordination, and it is one 
of the most difficult obstacles to overcome.   An example of how this could impact 
community oriented policing could be when police officers are supposed to work with 
social services to help bring a certain service to a dangerous area.  A final, and 
extremely costly, step is a reduction in the use of force.  As discussed earlier, the 
police in Latin America tend to use force frequently and sometimes unnecessarily.  
Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas say that reducing police violence requires:  
“applying principles of necessity (react violently only when attacked violently), 
proportionality (scale responses to the intensity, duration, and magnitude of the 
aggression), rationality (take nonlethal measures first and do not provoke an 
escalation of violence), and discrimination (distinguish between the violent and 
those who are not).”44 
 
Reforming the police so they follow these rules is difficult when they are used to 
operating with impunity, as is convincing police who are used to using violence that it 
is not necessarily the best strategy.  
The final type is when a police department, or a nation as a whole, embraces 
community policing as an all-encompassing philosophy.  This entails both the less 
and more costly community-policing programs.  It should impact institutional culture, 
mission and evaluation.  At this level it also requires intensive community 
participation and political will and leadership. Of the case studies that will be 
discussed in the next chapter none reach this point except, perhaps, in the case of 
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Santa Tecla in El Salvador.  One must also note that many argue that achieving this 
point is not possible, even in countries such as the U.S. and Great Britain that first 
embraced community oriented policing.   
Some authors say that what I discuss above is simply a difference in opinion 
about what community policing should entail.  One group understands community 
policing as a strategy for the police to produce better intelligence through community 
councils, “sector policing,” and other community oriented policing strategies, 
whereas the other group assigns it a different role, and argues that communities are 
meant to have a say in how they are policed; consequently it is a philosophy not a 
strategy.45  I find that the two should not be separated because the second view is the 
final stage that community oriented policing should eventually reach.  At this stage, 
the police should enjoy general legitimacy, and, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
legitimization of the police contributes to legitimization of the state as a whole, and 
they should benefit from the closer police-community relationship brought on by 
COP.   
Now that various types of community oriented policing strategies have been 
discussed, and that I’ve hopefully clarified what it usually entails, a discussion on 
implementing police reform is required.  It is generally agreed that starting and 
continuing any sort of policing strategy has three general steps, formulation, 
implementation and evaluation, and that each are important for many reasons. 
Formulating a COP strategy is the first step in the process, and can be 
difficult.  It should include input from members of local government, civil society and 
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the police.  It has been found that purely top down approaches, when it is imposed by 
government; tend to fail because the police resist reforms imposed in that way 
because they believe that that bureaucrats do not understand what it means to police.  
Consequently the police should be involved in the programs design from the 
beginning.  In a best case scenario members of the police from various divisions and 
levels would be invited to assist in formulation so that the lower ranks would not feel 
excluded.  Lower rank exclusion can lead to their rejecting new forms of police 
reform, just as higher-ranking officers can reject it when they feel that the 
government is imposing reform.  In addition to considering various parties opinions, 
the formulation stage also needs to take into consideration best practices, whether 
domestic or international, the state’s financial capacity, and it should try to 
realistically predict how long the program will take to implement so as to avoid 
creating unrealistic expectations.  
Police reform implementation is difficult and widely regarded as erratic 
throughout the region, partially because it has many obstacles to overcome.  The first 
obstacle is gaining police acceptance for the strategy.  As mentioned earlier, the 
police in Latin America remain hierarchic and generally against demilitarizing.  Many 
authors also note that if higher ranks embrace reform the lower ranks won’t 
necessarily and vice versa.  Even if the state invests heavily in training police in 
community policing techniques, institutional resistance can prevent the training from 
being effective.   
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The second obstacle is gaining the community’s trust.   One reason, which 
Unger notes, is that due to general distrust of the police in Latin America some people 
view community policing as a way for the police to spy on people more efficiently.46 
This may be due to the authoritarian past in many countries in Latin America, when 
domestic spying was a large part of the police’s mission.  He and Arias argue that the 
best way to overcome a communities’ fear of the police is to initially engage through 
trusted civil society actors who can mediate between the people and the police.47  
Although this does seem to be a good strategy, it does not always appear to be 
necessary and a trusted political actor may be able to serve this role as well.   
Once police resistance is overcome, COP programs are usually started in a 
pilot site, but they often fail to expand beyond the initial locations, or beyond a small 
group of police trained in COP techniques.  One reason for this may be community 
apathy, many people do not necessarily want to serve on police-community boards or 
neighborhood phone trees nor do they think they have time for it.  Another problem, 
which Koonings and Krujit note, is that due to the existing levels of violence in some 
areas, communities are already fragmented and consequently finding people to serve 
on boards will be difficult.48  In addition, if the community is very insecure, illicit 
actors may threaten people who join community boards or other organizations and 
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consequently they may be too afraid to join.  Other implementation issues can include 
general bureaucratic slowness, lack of qualified instructors, funding issues, lack of 
political commitment or policy changes caused by changes in administration, 
corruption and other problems that will be covered more specifically in the chapter on 
case studies.   
The final step in police reform is program evaluation.  Evaluation of 
community policing programs should include studies on the: (1) impact on the 
reduction of crime and violence (2) perception of citizen insecurity (3) levels of 
police violence and corruption (4) levels of trust/distrust between community and 
police (5) expansion and continuity of the programs (6) collaboration with other 
bureaucratic agencies.49  In addition to these I would recommend measuring the level 
of community participation in community policing programs because, as will be 
noted later in the case studies, community policing can be implemented; however, if 
the community does not want to be involved with it the program will not succeed.  
The percentage of unreported crime could be used as a proxy for community 
participation because if the people do not trust the police enough to report crime then 
they certainly will remain uninvolved in assisting with investigations and other COP 
strategies.  Various scholars note that evaluation seems to be the most ignored step 
throughout Latin America in virtually all government programs.  This theme will be 
reiterated in the subsequent chapter on the case studies.   
There are many concerns with the community-policing model.  One concern is 
that it rarely seems to have a noticeable impact on crime in any place where it has 
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been implemented, including in the U.S., or that it has an uneven impact on crime.50  
For example, community policing may decrease petty crime, but not homicides, or it 
may have a greater impact in a higher income neighborhood than in a lower income 
one.  Some authors, such as Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, argue that it will be 
ineffective in Latin America because its emphasis on decentralization and 
demilitarization will leave nations open to what they call “mid-level threats” such as 
TCO’s and organized street gangs.51 They consequently recommend a national 
“hybrid force,” that has the capacity to both engage with the community, for example 
through block policing, but which also has a “surge capacity” to fight organized 
crime.  Other authors note that reforms to enhance accountability are sometimes 
perceived in Latin America as damaging to the police’s decision-making capabilities 
and that it will reduce police ability to commit to decisive action. 52  Another concern 
is that community oriented policing may encourage neighbors to spy and report on 
each other as they did during the dictatorships. 
I hope that in the subsequent section my case studies will show that 
community oriented and other types of preventive policing remain a better alternative 
to the militarized policing model because they reduce police abuses and enhance the 
community’s feeling of security as well as their faith in the state.   
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Chapter Three:  Case Studies 
 
Case I:  Brazil 
 
 As discussed earlier, Brazil has many similarities with other Latin American 
countries such as its dictatorial history, high crime rates, and corrupt and generally 
distrusted police.  The image of heavily armed police charging into favelas in Rio de 
Janeiro and Sao Paulo has become a frequent image on the news, particularly since 
the country is preparing to host both the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 
2016.  Because the favelas do not encourage the promotion of a new, modern, Brazil, 
the government has stated that they want to “pacify” the favelas before these events.  
Considering the countries high crime rate and continuing poverty (21.4 % of the 
population lives below the poverty line)53, the governments various attempts at police 
and other reforms are unsurprising.  Just recently Brazilians have taken to the streets 
to protest unfair government laws and widespread corruption at all levels of 
government, and in some locations the police reacted with tear gas and violence.  This 
has led to new calls for reform and the nations President, Dilma Rousseff, has said 
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that it will be forthcoming.54 This section will examine the police division in Brazil, 
followed by a discussion on general police reform plans, followed by cases from Rio 
de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, and Sao Paulo.   
Brazil is a decentralized federal nation with twenty-six states.  Each state has a 
Civilian Police Service (sometimes called the Judicial Police) that investigates crimes 
and is in charge of administrative duties such as issuing identification cards.   The 
states also have Military Police units; these units are responsible for criminal 
investigations, crime prevention and uniformed patrol.  To this day they are 
considered a part of the Brazilian Army Reserve.  This police unit will be discussed in 
all the cases.  Brazil also has a Federal Police Department which investigates federal 
crimes such as drug and human smuggling.  They are also the head of Brazil’s 
immigration authority.  In addition to these three large police groupings, Brazil also 
has a Federal Highway Police Department, a Federal Rail Police Department, a 
National Public Safety Force (a uniformed federal force that was created to help state 
governor’s when the police go on strike or if a crisis occurs), and municipal guards.55  
Like in other Latin American countries, the police in Brazil are poorly paid and 
corruption is endemic throughout the ranks.  
In Brazil, the military junta negotiated their loss of power in 1985; 
consequently they were initially able to retain many privileges such as six cabinet-
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level positions, the intelligence agencies and a role in the management of strategic 
resources.  Although their power has diminished considerably since then, for example 
they no longer hold any cabinet level positions and the Cardoso administration (1994-
2002) created a civilian ministry of defense to replace the service ministers, the 
military continues to influence the military police.56   Leeds argues that since the 
government democratized the criminal justice system is the part of the government 
which has made the least progress, she points to the fact that it was virtually 
unchanged by the 1988 Constitution, and that the police never moved from, 
“protecting the state…to protecting its citizenry.”57   
The lack of change is evident in the military police’s design.  It retains a 
hierarchical command structure and an emphasis on repressive rather than preventive 
policing.  Because the majority of policing reforms undertaken in Brazil have tried to 
reform it, and because it appears to bear the most responsibility for police abuses in 
Brazil, it will be discussed the most.  Police abuse is a widespread and serious 
problem, and can include everything from torture and extrajudicial killings to falsified 
information in court and day-to-day corruption.  According to official statistics, the 
police in Rio killed 355 people in 1998; in 2003 they reportedly killed 1,195 people.58  
These numbers continued to escalate.  In 2007, at the peak of police killings, they 
killed 1,330 people, in 2008 1,137, in 2009, 1,048 and in 2010, 855.  The Washington 
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Office on Latin America says that if one compares this with the amount of police 
killed it is about a forty to one ratio, with forty citizens killed per police officer.59  Rio 
is not the only city with a problem; the police in Sao Paulo apparently kill as many 
people every two years as the military junta killed in the whole country during its 22-
year dictatorship.60   
Throughout the country, the majority of people killed by the police are young, 
Afro-Brazilian males, this has led to allegations of racism, and means that this 
population has an even greater problem integrating into society and finding work 
because they are stigmatized as criminals.  This perpetuates the cycle of poverty and 
enables their potential involvement in illicit markets.  Many write that the violence in 
Brazil will never end, and that police reform will never succeed because the police 
force has, “resolutely defended its right to extort and kill with impunity.”61  To some 
degree the perpetration of violence against civilians has been institutionalized in 
Brazil, and until the mid 90’s police officers were given bonuses and promotions for 
“bravery;” such as killing urban youth.62   Likewise the police are known for being 
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corrupt and some reports claim that police recruits are taught how to extort before 
they start working as police.63   
Because of the general negativity surrounding the police, Brazilian politicians 
at all levels have tried to ameliorate the situation.  As discussed in an earlier chapter, 
poor policing reflects the state and so if people lack trust in the police then they lack 
trust in the state, consequently politicians have a clear interest in police reform.  In 
2000, then president-Cardoso proposed the National Plan for Public Security (PNSP, 
Plan Nacional de Seguranca Publica).  This plan was supposed to finance the 
restructuring and professionalization of the police and address the lack of 
standardization among the different police agencies.64  It included support for training 
provincial police officers, incentives for community policing, and the creation of 
police auditors.  In 2002, Luiz Inacio da Silva’s administration took power and 
decreased funding; Bailey and Dammert write that the plan never really took off the 
ground, and that it was widely criticized.65  Subsequently the da Silva administration 
proposed its own plan for security reform, called the Workers Party Plan; however, 
this plan was apparently never implemented.66   
The lack of continuation between administrations, as demonstrated in the 
example above, is a common theme throughout police reform in Latin America, and 
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is one of the many reasons why reforms fail frequently.  Although these were some of 
the first national security plans designed to address policing in the democratic era, 
community policing was attempted in Brazil before these plans were proposed.  The 
first discussions of community policing occurred in the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro in 1982, after the first governor’s were democratically elected, and although 
these initial discussions did not lead to any real changes they did set a precedent for 
future reforms.67  
I am going to begin my discussion on the different cities in this section with 
Rio de Janeiro, the second largest city in Brazil by population, because the city has a 
long history of police violence and attempted police reform.  The city began in 2000 
with the GPAE (Special Areas Policing Group), which was supposed to enhance 
positive relations between favela residents and the police in certain favelas 
surrounding the city, typically the ones closest to the wealthy areas.   This program 
was supposed to provide a police presence twenty-four hours a day.   To implement 
the program, the Military Police worked with a local NGO, Viva Rio, to provide 
activities for at risk teens and promote police accountability.68   If the program 
succeeded it was supposed to be expanded to all of the cities (at the time) 500 favelas.   
The program initially fell under the leadership of Majors Carballo and Antunes, both 
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of who, according to all accounts, were serious reformers and able to develop trusting 
relationships with favela residents.69 
Two of the favelas where GPAE was implemented were Tubarao and 
Ceuzinho.   These two are located near wealthier areas, and suffered a massacre in 
May 2000, when members of the police killed five residents after invading the 
favela.70  The massacre provided the political impetus to attempt to solve violence in 
the community, particularly because it received widespread domestic and 
international attention.  GPAE as a whole was based off of Operation Cease Fire in 
Boston, which was one of the original community based policing projects.  Operation 
Cease Fire was used to bring Boston’s gangs under control and is frequently cited as a 
precursor to other community policing projects.  In the favela itself, the police began 
by initiating a social occupation, which means that the same police patrolled every 
day, and the police had to go through a training program that was supposed to 
increase their professionalism.  The program did initially decrease violence 
dramatically, and a rapport seemed to build between the residents and the police.71   
Working with the NGO and social programs also helped encourage trust, as did 
working with local power brokers.  However, after three years violence returned after 
                                                
69 "On the Rio Beat." BBC News, 5 11, 2001. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/1312855.stm (accessed June 24, 2013). 
 
70 Enrique Desmond Arias. Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro. Chapel Hill, NC: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 2006., 61  
 
71 Arias, 88-89 
 
 34 
financing for the project ended and after Major Antunes, the trusted reformer, moved 
on to work in Brasilia. 
GPAE was similarly attempted in the Pavao-Pavozinho and Cantagalo favelas 
from 2000-2002 and in the Cavalao favela from 2002 to 2004.  Like in Tubarao and 
Ceuzinho, the police were supposed to educate the youth about their role in the 
community and focus on diminishing homicides.  According to Fruhling they were 
able to establish order and reduce shootouts through police presence and by enabling 
residents access to social services.72  Like in the other favelas, the plan fell through 
after a change of Major and Mayor.  Fruhling notes that he does not consider it a form 
of community policing and says that it was more a form of police control blended 
with social assistance because it did not establish a dialogue with the community.73   
 In all of these cases the end result was the same, after initial successes 
homicide rates climbed and police violence resumed.  In addition, when the 
community was polled, some members complained that the police remained corrupt 
and that they did not receive sufficient funds from the state.74  The program also only 
spread to six out of the cities five hundred favelas, and only 100 of the cities 33,000 
police officers were engaged in the program.75  GPAE formally ended in 2005.   
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The city started a similar program in 2008, but this one is called “Pacifying 
Police Units,” or UPP.  These are units within the military police that are specially 
charged with policing the favelas after a special operations unit, called BOPE (short 
for Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais) takes control of the streets.  Initially 
the BOPE unit did not warn local gangs that they were going to invade but they have 
since changed this practice and have started warning them, this has led to a reduction 
in deaths during the invasions.76  After the police retake the streets, social programs 
are supposed to be introduced.  Police officers in the UPP are recruited fresh out of 
the academy after taking special training courses; this is supposed to prevent 
corruption.77   In addition, the police officers are required to perform community 
service in the favelas where they are stationed and they are better paid than the 
average police officer.  In 2010 the program was updated with “UPP Social” in 
already pacified favelas, this is supposed to better coordinate services within the 
favela and engage the community through meetings.   The community is supposed to 
be represented in these meetings by their Community Security Councils, and these 
councils are supposed to advise the police and service providers about what their 
community truly needs.78  WOLA says that polls of citizens living in these favelas 
show that 83% of them think that their community is either “better” or “much better” 
with the UPP as opposed to before.   
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As of April 2013, UPP programs have spread to 30 favelas, and the program is 
generally praised.79   Vanda Felbab-Brown notes that the UPP program has been more 
successful than the GPAE program because of political support.  The Mayor, Eduardo 
Paes, who initiated the program, was reelected partially on the popularity of his 
security program, as well as his skill in preparing for the major sporting events that 
the city will be hosting.80 The Mayor has also successfully drawn in members of the 
private sector and other NGO’s; prominent among them is AfroReggae, to the 
pacified areas to assist in further engaging the community.81  However, the favelas 
receiving the program remain those closest to wealthy and/or tourist areas.  For 
example, the most recent spread of the UPP was to the favelas near the Christ the 
Redeemer Statue before a visit by Pope Francis.  In addition, some groups say that the 
initial action to “retake” the favelas is unnecessarily violent, because it is heavily 
militarized and has lead to violence.  The city also has continued issues with 
corruption, including at very high levels within the police.  A recent anti-corruption 
sting called “Operation Guillotine,” resulted in 38 arrests, including the former 
deputy chief of the Civil Police, on charges of (among other things) selling weapons 
                                                
79 "Police Occupy Favela's around Rio's Christ Statue." BBC News, 4 29, 2013. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22346330  (accessed June 24, 2013).  
** Note that while earlier articles say that the city had 500 favelas, the estimate has now risen to 1,000 
with 1.4 million people living in them.  If this was a city it would be the 9th largest in Brazil.   
 
80 Felbab-Brown, 19  
 
81 Ricardo Geromel. "Eduardo Paes, Rio de Janeiro's Mayor, Reveals Where The Money Is Heading 
To In Brazil: Favelas." Forbes, 1 31, 2013. 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ricardogeromel/2013/01/31/eduardo-paes-rio-de-janeiros-mayor-reveals-
where-the-money-is-heading-to-in-brazil-favelas/ (accessed June 24, 2013).  
 
 37 
and drugs back to local traffickers, and “involvement in prostitution and illegal 
gambling.”82 
With the updated “UPP Social” program it does appear that Rio is trying to 
implement greater community oriented policing in the city; however, in my typology 
I would say that it has elements of COP at most because they started a dialogue with 
the community recently, and because the initial action remains extremely kinetic and 
so it does not have the demilitarized components COP requires.  In addition, the 
programs slow spread means that most of the cities favela residents do not have 
access to it.  Another concern about the program regards the political motives for its 
implementation, the UPP program has received a lot of positive press, but it has not 
reached far and so one could wonder whether it is a PR move combined with an 
attempt to better the areas near wealthy/tourist areas but not a genuine reform attempt.  
This means that the program is not very costly to the police because they have 
received positive press without engaging fully with the community while maintaining 
a militarized component.  However, the program does seem to be improving the lives 
of the citizens in the favelas where it has been implemented, and police violence has 
apparently decreased so it should be further expanded to other favelas and greater 
attempts at police-community dialogue should be made. All reports indicate that the 
city does plan on expanding UPP further, and so, one can hope, that it will also 
expand to more outlying favelas.   
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Although Belo Horizonte, the capitol of Minas Gerais, is not as large nor does 
it have as many favelas as either Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paulo (it is the third largest 
city in Brazil), the city approached COP in a unique manner and so it is worth 
discussing.  It began when academics in the criminology program at the local 
university (called the Center for Studies in Criminality and Public Security, Centro de 
Estudios de Criminalidad y Seguridad Pública or CRISP) started building ties to the 
police through the first crime-mapping program in Brazil and by offering courses for 
police.  These courses eventually became police requirements.  The crime-mapping 
program was based off CompStat in the United States.  Like CompStat it maps the 
locations and times when crimes occur frequently.83  This is supposed to allow the 
police to identify areas and times where/when they should, for example, patrol more.  
Arias says that the partnership between academics and police has led to the best crime 
data set in all Brazil.84   
The data set was subsequently used to: evaluate the police, they called the 
program “Policing with Results,” and create a community-policing program where 
security councils were created in every precinct so community members could freely 
debate security policies.  De Mesquita Neto says that although people generally felt 
safer once the program was implemented there was no noticeable reduction in crime 
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and genuine communication with the community was lacking.85  He adds that the 
poorer areas seemed to gain the least. De Mesquita Neto says that this occurred 
because the communities were expected to help subsidize the new policing programs, 
for example by funding new equipment purchases.  Fruhling also notes that they had 
problems coordinating with other public entities such as the mayors office and the 
judiciary, and that many of the frequently encountered obstacles to change existed 
such as, lack of funding, inability to maintain the same police in the same area, and 
lack of identification with the program among lower ranking officers.86 
The COP component of the Plan was based off the GPAE in Rio de Janeiro 
called GEPAR (Grupo Especializado de Policiamento em Areas de Risco).  Like the 
program in Rio, they worked with a local nonprofit called Fica Vivo which created 
programs for young people to prevent them from joining gangs.  In addition they 
focused on preventative policing, and on using violence sparingly and in a controlled 
manner.  A Professor from the University of Minas Gerais, Elenice de Souza, notes 
that the program is based on continuous evaluation to monitor whether or not the 
police are being effective.87  In addition to taking special courses, the GEPAR police 
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are also supposed to commit to at least two years in GEPAR, so as to further enable 
the community to get to know them and vice versa.   
In the six favelas where GEPAR has been deployed it has halved homicides, 
and polls show that 80% or more community members say that they have noted a 
reduction in violence and that they feel safer.88  The community; however, continues 
to support it hesitantly and two-thirds report continued corruption and half report 
continued abuses and so the program cannot be called a total success.89  In addition, 
many people give more credit to Fica Vivo than to the police for the programs 
successes.  De Souza also notes that youths are hesitant to join Fica Vivo’s activities 
because it may lead to their being branded as a police informant and so they fear 
retaliation from local gangs if they join.   She believes that this has limited the 
amount of youths the program can reach and weakened the Fica Vivo’s youth 
outreach component.90  Arias and Unger find that regardless the involvement of Fica 
Vivo has been necessary for the programs success because it provided a buffer 
between the people and the police and enabled greater trust between them.  
Like Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte has elements of community oriented 
policing but has not achieved it fully.  Similarly, the program has spread slowly and 
has had difficulties engaging with poor communities.  However, I would say that it is 
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more advanced than that of Rio because of the intense involvement with the 
University which was involved from the beginning of the programs design, and which 
continues to evaluate the program.  The evaluation stage is key to community 
oriented policing and it appears that in Belo Horizonte they are attempting to evaluate 
programs in a serious and organized manner.  As discussed in my typology, 
evaluation is a costly step for institutions because it enables members of civil society 
and the government to judge them in an informed manner and it makes it harder to 
hide malfeasance.  The intense involvement of Fica Vivo also seems to be one of the 
main reasons for the programs success and proves that engagement with the 
community is necessary for successful community oriented policing, and is costly 
because they are relying on an outside actor to engage successfully.   
All of this explains why Belo Horizonte is frequently cited as an example in 
policing literature; it is one of the most innovative models tried so far, particularly in 
Brazil and they do seem to be on their way towards spreading community oriented 
policing throughout the city.  As Fruhling approvingly notes, the GEPAR program, 
“appears to be a first step in transforming the police into a truly modern, democratic 
organization.”91  Taking this into consideration I would rank this program in the 
higher second tier of my typology because various elements of community oriented 
policing have been implemented, and because they appear to be trying to genuinely 
engage with the community.  It is not in the third tier because police and community 
resistance to the reforms continues to exist, and because it has not spread throughout 
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the city, and so it appears that the police as a whole has not adopted COP as more 
than a strategy.  As discussed in the typology, full community oriented policing 
requires a cultural shift within the institution where it guides all their policing actions.   
A working group in Sao Paulo, the largest city in Brazil, first proposed a 
community-policing model in 1993 after 1992 was a record year for civilian 
homicides (1,458) perpetrated by the police.92  Although this led to the creation of a 
police ombudsman, little else happened until 1997 when there was another scandal.  
Following this, the new governor fired the commander general of the military police 
and created a community-policing commission with representatives from the military 
police, the civilian police and the community.93  It was called the Advisory 
Committee for the Implementation of Community Policing and members of the 
community included representatives from human rights groups, community councils, 
business councils, the Public Prosecutors Office, the Lawyers Guild of Brazil and 
others.  This commission established three main goals: to transform the military 
police into an organization that consults and collaborates with the community, to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of police services, and to improve public 
safety through crime reduction, greater order and increased security.94   
The police subsequently selected 41 zones to implement the project between 
December 1997 and July 2001.  Eventually half of all posts had community policing 
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programs and smaller neighborhood sub-commissaries, and16,000 police officers 
were trained in COP techniques.95  This led to increased preventive patrols, the 
establishment of mobile stations, efforts to increase school security and drug 
prevention, and the creation of neighborhood community councils.   Although the 
community councils were intended to increase community involvement, Fruhling 
says that evaluations showed that the dialogue in the community councils was usually 
unproductive.96 
In 2000 the main business association in Sao Paulo created the Center for the 
Study of Violence (ISPCV) and funded the “Disque Denuncia,” (“Crime Stoppers”) 
program along with the state secretary of public security and the military and civilian 
police.  The program runs a call center to facilitate anonymous tips to the police; de 
Mesquita Neto says that it has improved collaboration between the community and 
the police, increased police effectiveness and efficiency in detecting and 
apprehending criminals, and increased police responsiveness to community needs and 
expectations and that its success is evidenced by the fact that it helped the police 
solve over 9,000 crimes by 2003.97  The ISPCV is also one of the community 
organizations on the community policing commission and has supported crime 
mapping initiatives and held forums on enhancing public security and violence 
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reduction.98  It exists to this day and partners frequently with the Center for the Study 
of Violence at the University of Sao Paulo, and publishes public data on 
denunciations and crime.99    
Studies have shown that the community has generally responded positively to 
these initiatives, even though concerns remain that it favors the wealthy and 
particularly the business community because they are the major funders.  However, a 
public opinion poll showed that 56.9% of Sao Paulo’s residents find the community 
police accessible, versus 10.5% for traditional police and that only .6% considered 
community police officers corrupt versus 60.2% for traditional police.  Although this 
is very positive data, only 14.5% of persons polled said that they thought that 
community police officers were more effective at solving crime.100 
Like with Rio and Belo Horizonte, Sao Paulo shows the importance of 
community involvement at all levels, and the difference that one dedicated 
organization (in this case the business association) can make.  However, it also brings 
up a common concern with community oriented policing, that it may not be as 
effective at preventing crime as a more militarized policing model.  Although Sao 
Paulo attempted to spread community oriented policing throughout the city, it 
continues to experience high levels of violence and police abuse.  In 2012 a gang war 
broke out when the Primeiro Comando da Capital prison gang, revolted and killed 
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over 140 people in one weekend; the police response was brutal and many 
accusations of human rights abuses and police murders were subsequently leveled.101  
The appropriate use of force is key to community oriented policing, and consequently 
this seems to indicate that the police in Sao Paulo still have a long way to go.  They 
do not seem willing to renounce that portion of their power, this may be because they 
feel that the security challenges faced cannot be fought without a militarized 
response.  Even though they maintain a militarized component, I am ranking 
community policing in Sao Paulo in the middle of the second tier of my typology 
because of the extensive partnering with civil society organizations, improvements in 
trustworthiness and use of other community oriented policing like strategies.   
Case II: Mexico 
 
 Like Brazil, Mexico has a high crime rate and a decentralized police force that 
is renowned for being corrupt and abusive at all levels. It currently has police at the 
federal, state and municipal level, and a military that is involved in the domestic war 
against the TCO’s and which has appropriated many characteristics and duties 
typically found in a police force.  Human Rights Watch reported in February 2013 
that during President Felipe Calderon’s six-year presidency at least 250 people were 
“disappeared” by security forces, the security force which appears most frequently in 
their report is the local police.  They link 95 disappearances to local police forces and 
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13 to federal (the rest are either Army or Navy).102  In addition to being abusive, the 
police are not effective; an estimated 10% of crimes committed are prosecuted, this 
clearly does not include unreported crimes and, like in the rest of Latin America, the 
cifra negra is suspected to be vast.103 
Attempts at police reform began in the 1990’s under President Zedillo.  The 
majority of the reforms have attempted to improve human rights, enhance 
coordination between the various forces, and improve technology, discipline, 
recruitment and training, to name a few areas.104  Various presidents have also 
debated federalizing the entire police force to enhance coordination and discipline.  
Most recently, the current president, Enrique Pena Nieto, suggested creating a 10,000 
strong paramilitary police force, which he would call the Gendarmerie, to fight the 
TCO’s and replace the military in its domestic duties.  This is a part of his security 
plan called, Pacto por Mexico, which will also create unified state-level 
commands.105 This is supposed to reduce corruption and increase competence; 
Felbab-Brown says that it should theoretically replace the old system in which local 
police were treated like local politicians personal, “militias.”106   
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President Calderon, Pena Nieto’s predecessor, tried to reform the municipal 
police through the, “power of the purse,” which means that they restricted funding for 
underperforming municipal police units.107  Sabet notes that this was an attempt to 
force the police to become accountable to the federal government; however, it did not 
create any sort of accountability to the community.  The federal government 
simultaneously encouraged the, “limited discretion model,” which limited the police’s 
discretion and knowledge of an area in the hopes of limiting corruption and human 
rights abuses.108  This prevented the police from understanding how communities 
were permeated by crime, and reduced the opportunity for effective intelligence; in 
other words, this model was the opposite of community oriented policing.   
Sabet argues that the community must become involved in policing in Mexico 
for various reasons.  One reason which he notes is that the community facilitates poor 
policing through their day to day acceptance of corruption and bribery at all levels, 
for example, he says that many citizens will offer a bribe before it is requested so as 
to avoid trouble.109  However, Sabet also notes that achieving community 
involvement in policing will be difficult because, according to his research; people in 
Mexico tend to resist the creation of citizen community councils because they 
immediately suspect that they are being created to serve clientelistic purposes and that 
they will become the pawns of local politicians, as occurred during the PRI’s one-
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party rule.110  During the PRI’s rule politicians effectively doled out favors in return 
for votes and control over the community.  After one-party rule ended this tradition 
continued, particularly at the local level.  This needs to be overcome because, as 
Felbab-Brown argues, the creation of security councils is important because their 
creation involves the community and tends to moderate the police’s use of force.111  If 
one accepts Mexico’s leading expert Sabet’s analysis, then the creation of effective 
community councils will probably be extraordinarily difficult.  Sabet also notes that 
lack of continuity between administrations at both the federal and state level can 
prevent reforms from having an impact, like in Brazil. 
Clearly, the Mexican police needs reform.  One city, which has tried to 
implement elements of community oriented policing, is Mexico City, also called the 
DF.   It is the largest city in the Western Hemisphere, and while it is not necessarily a 
part of Mexico most affected by the rise in drug related violence, it does have a crime 
problem and has had problems with police abuse.  The first attempt at community 
policing occurred in in the late 1990’s when Cardenas was the mayor, nothing really 
happened but it was resuscitated under Lopez Obrador in the early 2000’s and was 
formally established as the “Policia de Barrio” (Neighborhood Police) in 2003.   
This program aimed to reestablish the confidence of the people in the police 
by giving them a voice in policing strategies and police evaluation.112   By 2006 an 
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estimated 6% of the preventive police were supposedly trained as community police 
officers.  They were assigned to specific neighborhoods and required to attend 
community meetings.   The meetings are supposed to be run by elected members of 
the neighborhood; however, Muller notes that after the initial election most 
neighborhoods never held another one.113  The elected members are supposed to 
inform other members in the community about the information shared at the 
meetings, but Muller argues that instead the meetings were “privatized,” and that 
members on the committee would use the police to, for example, protect their 
personal businesses.  In addition, he finds that the police were not trained properly 
and that they failed to maintain specific patrolling schedules and locations.  This is 
counter to community policing.   
Although one may think that Muller has a bias, other authors also note that 
this attempt was a failure.  Koonings and Krujit found that few people were willing to 
serve on the councils, and that those who did participate typically tried to coopt the 
process.114  In addition, they note that the policing process was further militarized 
under Lopez Obrador, which is the opposite of what community policing should be 
trying to accomplish.  I am inclined to agree with the above-mentioned authors; all 
signs point to a failed attempt at community oriented policing in the DF.  Like 
Muller, I agree that it seems that these reforms were undertaken for cosmetic 
purposes, and so they would fall under the first category in my typology, which is 
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when community oriented policing is a public relations scheme and not a genuine 
attempt. 
Other cities in Mexico have attempted some elements of community oriented 
policing.  In Mexicali they developed a neighborhood watch program; however, after 
being carried over by two administrations it ended.115  In Tijuana a similar situation 
occurred when one administration created neighborhood councils, and a subsequent 
administration stopped supporting it.  At the state level, Baja California created a 
state level community council in 1999.  This council was initially granted access to 
arrest and other data; however, their access was curtailed under a subsequent 
administration.  Sabet says that this was the most promising experiment he found in 
Mexico.116   
Guanajuato also attempted to implement state-level community policing in 
2001.  The administrator in charge of it, Torres, writes that a pilot program was 
implemented in seven communities in seven districts in the central area of the state.  
He says that it had support at all levels of government and that initial results were 
successful because members of the community reported feeling safer and crime 
appeared to decrease.  His article was written in 2003, I have found no evidence for 
the subsequent continuation of this program, and so it appears that, like the other 
Mexican attempts, it eventually fell by the wayside.117  Guanajuato has; however, 
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attempted to implement a new community-policing program.   In January 2013, the 
head instructor from Israel’s policing academy went to Guanajuato to discuss forming 
community-policing and bringing the police closer to the community; they plan on 
creating ten schools to start training police in the methods the instructor 
recommended.118   
Recently, there has been much discussion of “community policing” in parts of 
Guerrero and the Costa Chica.   However, these groups are not composed of 
community police officers, they are composed of vigilante type groups.  These areas 
are rural and have limited policing presence so the villagers (sensibly enough) banded 
together to create a sort of policing, without input from the state.   They adjudicate 
crimes through a local community council.119  In March 2013 a group of “community 
police” detained a local police chief in Guerrero on charges of corruption and 
collaboration with TCO’s and did not release him until the state agreed to investigate.  
I am not arguing that their claims were baseless; however, I am arguing that they are 
not community police.  Although community policing has many different definitions, 
all adhere to the basic fact that police are agents of the state; hence their legitimacy is 
intertwined with the legitimacy of the state.   In this instance, the existence of these 
groups is proof that the state lacks legitimacy because it cannot police its own people.   
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Because Mexico is currently suffering from extreme levels of violence, caused 
by its war against the TCO’s, the nation may want to wait to implement community 
policing at the national level, at least until these groups are weakened.  However, at 
the local level it should be implemented so as to reduce local police abuse and to 
enhance government legitimacy.  Additionally, the proposed gendarmerie should be 
trained in non-violent policing techniques so they avoid relying on violence.  Clearly, 
changes between administrations and lack of community enthusiasm and trust are 
major obstacles to police reform throughout the nation.  Non-corrupt, efficient police 
must overcome the lack of trust because the community will slowly accept that the 
police can change if they can see the changes. Guanajuato seems to be making a large 
initial investment in its new COP program, which signifies political buy-in; however, 
it is far too early to judge the experiment.  If successful it may serve as a pilot 
program for the rest of the nation.  The other examples given above all lead to failure, 
and consequently fit in the first category of my typology.  I did however include them 
because Mexico is an important state in Latin America and because the attempts show 
that there is some level of consensus that community input is necessary for successful 
policing.   
Case III: Chile  
 
 Like Brazil, Chile has a recent dictatorial past and a strong military culture.  
Crime rose during the 1970’s, and subsequently became a key political concern, this 
led to the “National Security Doctrine” under Pinochet’s dictatorship which 
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emphasized a, “militaristic conception of society.”120  After the dictatorship ended in 
1990, crime and the perception of crime among the population rose again, even 
though statistics show that Chile has historically had one of the lowest murder rates in 
all of Latin America.  The perception of crime is particularly strong in the cities, 
where 70% of the population lives, because 90% of crime is committed there.121   
Unlike Brazil and Mexico, Chile has a federalized police service which is divided 
between the Carabineros and the Investigative Police.   
The Carabineros are responsible for day-to-day and preventive policing, and 
will be the police organ discussed in this section.  Unlike the majority of other police 
services discussed in this paper they are widely respected and generally perceived to 
be relatively non-corrupt and less violent than other Latin American police forces; 
82% of the Chilean population reports trusting them.122  This is unexpected because 
they were key to repression during the military dictatorship, and, like the Military 
Police in Brazil, maintained many of their military characteristics because the junta 
was able to negotiate from a strong position during the political transition.  
Consequently they have retained their militaristic and hierarchical structure. The 
government has proposed moving the Carabineros from the Ministry of Defense to 
the Ministry of the Interior on multiple occasions, but this has been forcefully 
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resisted.123  Relations between the Carabineros and the government were also strained 
during the 1990’s, because some officers were put on trial for human rights abuses 
during the junta.  Despite these issues, various reforms have been gradually 
undertaken and generally well received. Chile is also the only nation in Latin America 
without an ombudsman who can investigate and prosecute human rights abuses.  This 
may be because the junta negotiated from a position of power and demonstrates the 
strong hold that the military still has over the nations collective psyche.   
During the mid 1990’s Neighborhood Watch type programs were started, and 
the government began funding them in 1995.124  In 1998, citizen prevention 
committees were formed in various neighborhoods in Santiago, but this program was 
rapidly terminated due to apparent issues with getting the neighbors to meet.  Bailey 
and Dammert say that these meetings were problematic because the role of the 
community still lacks definition in Chile.125   
In 1999 the Carabineros implemented the Quadrant Plan (Plan Cuadrante) 
throughout the nation, after starting in Santiago.  This plan certainly has elements of 
community oriented policing.  Through it the Carabineros are organized, by 
decreasing size with a chief of police for a zone, then prefectures, commissariats, 
liutenancies, into small forward operating locations inside neighborhoods (called 
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avanzadas).126   These increasingly small quadrants are supposed to facilitate greater 
interaction with the community and enable police to “identify” with the community 
and enhance people’s access to the police.127   
Another community policing like element in the Plan is maintaining the same 
police in a given quadrant at a certain time, so the police get to know the 
neighborhood and the community gets to know them.128  The police should then use 
the intelligence gleaned from working in the communities, and crime data sets, to 
determine how quadrants will be divided, and so, theoretically, high crime 
neighborhoods should have a higher police presence and continuous vigilance.129  
This should all lead to successful preventive policing.  Additionally, they have special 
delegates within each unit who are supposed to respond to community members 
concerns and have a unit dedicated to liaising with the community and community 
relations.130  
In 2000 and 2005 the government developed new performance indicators for 
the Carabineros.  The 2005 indicators were based on victimization surveys.  After 
analyzing the responses they started emphasizing the services they provided to the 
community and established a new program in 2006 called the, “Quality Improvement 
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Program for Police Services to the Community.” This program required the police to 
ask people who went to their stations to fill out a questionnaire regarding their 
experience.  This led to a new National Strategy for Public Security (Estrategia 
Nacional de Seguridad Publica) in 2007.131   This strategy called for a victimization 
reduction by 10%, a reduction in home robberies by 10% and a reduction in all other 
major crimes by 9% between 2006 and 2010.132  To accomplish these reductions they 
are trying to reduce the amount of time it takes police to arrive to a crime scene, they 
are encouraging people to denounce more crimes, and are trying to strengthen police-
community relations so as to solve more crimes and reduce impunity.133 
The Plan, and all these changes, are displayed prominently on the Carabineros 
website, and are frequently touted by Chileans.   The website explains that the Plan 
was implemented to further “friendship” between the police and the community, 
hence their slogan is “a friend, always” (“un amigo siempre!”).134  The Carabineros 
will also explain that they do not need community policing since they are “naturally” 
community based, and have always worked in the community.135  However, they are 
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not a community based police force because as Oviedo phrases it, the “Carabineros 
have experience working in the community not with the community.”136   
Generally, support for greater community involvement in policing does not 
appear to exist in Chile.  For example, some sectors of Chilean society want to further 
reduce the communities’ role in policing because they think it limits the Carabineros 
ability to respond in the moment.137  However, issues, which could potentially be 
mitigated through increased community involvement in policing, remain.  For 
example there are discrepancies between socio-economic groups and their 
perceptions of the police, typically the poor trust them the least.138  Lack of 
interagency cooperation also remains a problem, and, although the Carabineros do 
volunteer in the community, they do not have the ties with non-profits and 
community groups that exist in other countries.139   As noted earlier, these ties tend to 
enable trust building particularly with poorer segments of the population.  Regardless, 
they are one of the most trusted police forces in Latin America.  Pion-Berlin and 
Trinkunas say that they are the closest to what they think the majority of Latin 
American police forces should look like.  They find that the Carabineros are 
professional, relatively non-corrupt and respectful of human rights, and embedded in 
neighborhoods in addition to being paramilitary and consequently capable of 
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responding to crime.140  Consequently they propose that the Carabineros be used as an 
initial model for other Latin American countries.   
Although the Carabineros are not a community oriented policing force, I 
included this example because they have implemented elements of community 
oriented policing in a successful manner.  For example, their Quadrant Plan and 
maintaining the same officers in the same location has reduced crime successfully, 
and this example could be (and has been) carried into other nations that want to 
include elements of community oriented policing.  In addition, they clearly attempted 
to take the communities thoughts into consideration when revamping their security 
plan through the use of questionnaires.  However, they have not built functional 
community councils.   This may be impossible since, when councils were created, 
community members apparently did not commit to meetings and frequently skipped 
or stopped attending.  Lack of commitment from the community is one of the major 
obstacles to community oriented policing and is consequently understandable.   
Another way in which they are not a community oriented policing service is 
their unchanged, militarized nature.  A major goal of community oriented policing is 
reducing the militarization of the police; however, if they can be militarized without 
perpetrating violence against the population then this is not as serious an issue.  
Because the military and the Carabineros have been able to retain substantial prestige 
and power, even though they were involved with the military junta, they seem 
unwilling to give that up to the population through greater community involvement.   
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Although I think it may be helpful to involve the community more, the Carabineros 
overall seem to serve Chile well; however, demilitarizing them and moving them 
from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of the Interior may be recommendable 
so as to increase the police’s autonomy from the armed forces.   
Overall, I would include the Carabineros in the higher second tier of my 
typology because of the many community oriented policing strategies that they have 
implemented successfully.  They clearly have not reached the third tier because 
community policing is not a part of the Carabineros philosophy, they explicitly deny 
it, and since they have kept their militarized characteristics.   
Case Study IV: Colombia 
 
 Like Mexico, Colombia has suffered from extremely elevated levels of 
violence from non-state actors, including, but not limited to, TCO’s, paramilitary 
organizations and an active guerrilla insurgency that controls large swaths of territory.  
Consequently their security environment is different than that of, for example, Chile; 
however, the Colombian National Police is almost as trusted as the Carabineros; their 
public confidence levels are between 50-65%.141  Like the Carabineros, the National 
Police are centralized under one federal command.  The police had been extremely 
unpopular and feared, but during the 1990’s and into the 2000’s various reforms were 
undertaken.  
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 In 1991 the nation implemented a new Constitution that aimed to make the 
nation more democratic.  This lead to police reforms in 1993, which were considered 
important because it was an attempt at reform; however, the reforms did not 
accomplish anything.142   In 2003 and 2006 a new Organic Law for Policing and 
Security was implemented, which subdivided the police into State headquarters, a 
direction of civil security, rural security, anti-kidnapping squads, traffic and 
transportation police; despite these changes the centralized command remains 
intact.143  This has apparently assisted in making the police more effective and 
efficient.  Because of the extreme security environment that exists in the country, I 
will be focusing on community oriented policing attempts in Bogota.  Bogota is now 
relatively safe and has experimented with community oriented policing on various 
occasions.  Because of this it is the clearest case to judge. 
The first attempt at community oriented policing occurred in 1998 after the 
Chamber of Commerce paid for some policemen to study neighborhood policing 
techniques used by the police in Barcelona at the Universidad Javeriana in Barcelona.  
They hoped that they would learn how to encourage, “a closer relationship with the 
community, peaceful coexistence, crime deterrence and excellence in service.”144  
Upon their return, the 21 officers selected for this program, were supposed to spread 
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their knowledge among the police and create a Community Action Plan for Bogota.145  
The Plan was supposed to enable crime prevention, dissuasion and client services.  
Subsequently, in 2001, the police conducted a door-to-door survey to try to 
understand what risk factors existed in Bogota’s communities.  This led to the 
creation of Local Safety Fronts and Schools for Public Safety, so as to help the police 
accomplish their crime prevention goals.  The Fronts were supposed enable self-
protection among residents through alarm systems and phone trees.  The Schools 
were supposed to educate the community on the police’s role and preventive 
measures citizens could take.146  They were also supposed to dissuade crime through 
conflict mediation and frequent police patrols by the same officers and were supposed 
to enhance client services through a complaints and suggestions system inside police 
stations.147   
This program led to immediate opposition from mid and high level 
commanders because they felt that it would grant the officers too much autonomy.  
Vasquez explains that this opposition was predicable because, like the Brazilian and 
Chilean police, the Colombian police had a long hierarchical and militarized 
history.148   He says that few of the recruits trained in Barcelona remained with the 
police for long.  However, the police did persevere with the Local Safety Fronts.  
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According to Vasquez, these fronts became the only measure for effectiveness and in 
2006 there were 9686 Fronts that covered 15% of the cities residents.149  However, 
meetings were apparently very irregular both because residents had problems making 
it to meetings and because there were more Fronts than community police officers.  
The Chamber of Commerce performed a study evaluating the Fronts and found that 
30% of the alarm systems did not work, that 39% of the Fronts did not have telephone 
trees, and that in total only 81% were active.150  Vasquez goes on to note that: 
“paradoxically, the community police force in Colombia is one of the largest 
in Latin America, but it is clearly insufficient to fully establish a community 
model. While the total number of police officers increased 33% between 1998 
and 2007, growing from 101,289 individuals to 134,775, the number of 
community police officers increased by a mere 3.4% between 1999 and 2007. 
Additionally…this personnel is not equally distributed geographically, nor in 
terms of the population served.”151 
 
He also mentions that that community police officers were frequently used for 
purposes outside of their purview, such as for crowd control at large sporting events 
and as VIP bodyguards, and that this further weakened their role.152 
Vasquez’ piece was written before the 2010 launch of the “National Quadrant 
Community Surveillance Plan.”  It is based off of the Carabineros Quadrant Plan, in 
which the police are divided into smaller quadrants, and is supposed to be 
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implemented throughout the nation after starting in Bogota.153  Under this plan, the 
community police officers ceased to exist as an independent entity within the police 
and all police officers are supposed to, “act in accordance with community policing 
values and orientations.”154  According to the Plan, police are assigned to a specific 
quadrant and consequently should get to know the area and the community well, 
thereby enabling preventive action and trust building.  In addition, the police should 
educate citizens about their role in crime prevention and assist them with establishing 
communication networks.155  According to the action plan for implementing the Plan, 
they took various factors into consideration when designing the quadrants such as 
danger, risk factors, and the socio-economic background of the residents and tried to 
meet with community leaders before implementing the quadrants so as to design them 
successfully.156   
They are also supposed to improve their services through actionable 
intelligence; the Plan creates a Sectoral Center for Information and Police Strategy 
(CIEPS, Centro de Informacion Estrategica Policial Seccional) which requires local 
police stations to funnel intelligence to the Center.  This will theoretically enable 
better crime fighting strategies because they will be able to locate hot spots and 
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prevent crime. Throughout the action plan the authors emphasize relations with the 
community and working with service providers and community leaders.    
This Plan is different from Chiles’, because, unlike the Chilean Plan, the 
importance of the community and relations with it are stressed throughout and 
because they self-identify as a community oriented policing program.  The intense 
community involvement would indicate that the police in Colombia is willing to 
renounce a portion of their power to encourage greater transparency and respect for 
human rights. Unfortunately, the Plan is too new to judge; however, it seems to be a 
large improvement over previous Colombian attempts at community policing. Even 
the earlier attempt, with the disorganized Fronts, indicated that people in community 
policing areas felt safer, and consequently one can hope that this will improve upon 
it.157  There has been an intense financial investment in the Plan, over $2 million on 
training alone in the first year.  This investment apparently demonstrates that political 
will exists.  If the Action Plan is implemented as it is described than it may be the 
most dedicated and comprehensive community oriented policing Plan in Latin 
America thus far; however, as mentioned earlier it is too early to judge.  If all of the 
Plans goals are achieved, which is unlikely but possible, then policing in Colombia’s 
cities would reach the highest level in my typology.   
 
Case Study V: El Salvador 
 
 Like Brazil and Chile, El Salvador experienced a military dictatorship, unlike 
them, El Salvador’s ended after a 13 year long civil war between the government and 
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the left-leaning FMLN guerrillas.  The Peace Accords, which were signed in 1992, 
created all new security institutions, including the National Civil Police (Policia 
Nacional Civil PNC).   In addition to the National Civil Police, towns have a local 
municipal police; however, the National Police are responsible for most preventive 
and investigative policing.  According to the Accords, the new police force was 
supposed to be composed of 1/5 former guerrillas, 1/5 former National Police and 3/5 
civilians who were uninvolved in the conflict; this proved difficult from the start as 
more former National Police were allowed in than was technically permitted.158  After 
the Accords, crime rates rose rapidly, as did allegations of police committing human 
rights abuses and extrajudicial killings.159  Although initial public opinion polls 
showed that the people trusted the new police, this soon changed as crime rates and 
abuses skyrocketed, and to this day the police remains one of El Salvador’s most 
distrusted institutions.160    
 Soon after the Accords the US, the UN and other international institutions 
started working with the Salvadoran government to try to reform the police.   
Between 1999 and 2002 they implemented a CompStat like program called 
“Eficacia,” after being taught by and receiving funding from the United States 
Department of Justice.  This was supposed to enable them to find priority areas and 
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prevent crime; however, “Eficacia” also placed a major emphasis on arrests as a 
measure for success.161  The elevated arrest levels led to El Salvador’s famously 
overly crowded prisons; a Salvadoran report finds that prisons are currently operating 
at 299% of their capacity and that many people are in pre-trial detention.162  The 
Police also attempted community meetings in 1999, to hear the public’s opinion on 
their strategies and their concerns; however, this did not lead to concrete changes 
even though the public viewed the meetings positively.163   
The continuing growth in crime, particularly the murder rate, led to calls for 
more aggressive tactics against criminals.  This led to the “Mano Dura” (formally 
knows as the Emergency Anti Delinquency and Organized Crime Law) laws part I 
and II, in 2003 and 2008.164  These laws enabled the police to arrest people who 
looked like they may be a part of a gang; this led to more over-crowding and did not 
decrease violence or crime in any way.   Some scholars actually believe that it may 
have helped increase crime because jail serves as a “finishing school” for criminals 
where they can make contacts and learn from others.165  The overcrowded prisons led 
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to gang wars within the prisons, so the two main gangs, the Mara Salvatrucha and 
Barrio 18 were eventually separated by prison, this enabled the gangs to solidify their 
organization and hierarchy and to train newer members, thereby strengthening 
them.166  The murder rate eventually reached such levels that the Salvadoran 
government brokered a truce between the two gangs last spring, and this did seem to 
initially diminish homicides although the truce is currently suffering and homicides 
have escalated in some areas.   
 The Mano Dura strategies obvious failure has led to a shift away from these 
tactics, and led some areas to community oriented policing. Vanderbilt University, in 
conjunction with USAID, performed a Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP) in 2012 and part of this survey was evaluating the impact of community 
oriented policing in Central America.  They found that 32% of Salvadorans reported 
seeing police talking to the community and attending meetings.167  This is 
comparatively high next to other Central American nations.  In addition, they reported 
that El Salvador has the most community oriented policing in Central America, for 
example, police are stationed in public schools, they give talks to students about illicit 
narcotics and the dangers incurred by joining a gang, and are involved in sports 
programs.   
The Discipline through Sport (Disciplina a traves del deporte) program 
received particular acclaim.  It was started in 2011 by the PNC. Through the program, 
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300 police officers were placed in 166 of the highest risk schools in and around San 
Salvador to engage with students.  Some of the police officers became coaches to 
encourage the students to trust the police and eschew crime.  According to a 
newspaper article from El Salvador, in 2011, 136 students were killed, but in 2012 
none were killed from the schools which had the program.168  El Salvador also has the 
lowest perception of corruption among Central America countries, excluding Costa 
Rica.169 Despite these apparent successes, people polled for the LAPOP study 
reported that they still only denounced crimes to police officers they knew and trusted 
personally (which shows that corruption remains a concern) and that the police 
continued arbitrarily detaining young people who were standing on street corners 
without proof of their criminality or criminal connections.170 
 These national level attempts at community oriented policing seem to be 
having some impact (if not necessarily on crime) on the level of trust a community 
places in the police.  As discussed earlier this is important because trusting the police 
could be viewed as a proxy for trusting, and consequently legitimizing, the 
government, which is extremely important in a nation which had a relatively recent 
civil war and continues to suffer from widespread violence. 
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 Some municipalities attempted elements of community oriented policing 
before the large-scale nationwide attempts.  The town of Santa Tecla is one such 
example.  The town is one of San Salvador’s satellite towns, and was reportedly one 
of the most violent in the nation.  In 2000, the newly elected mayor, Mayor Ortiz, 
engaged with the community and started, “long-term plans that prioritized human and 
social development, citizen security, building capacity and coordination among local 
government agencies…with a strong emphasis on citizens’ participation.”171  The 
main focus of these plans was on crime prevention and “recuperating” public spaces 
through innovative means.   
To prevent crime they started “School Scholarships,” for children from 
kindergarten through university.  This program paid children $15-50 a month for 
receiving good grades and for performing community service.172  Community service 
could include assisting with the “recuperation,” for example by helping clean the city 
and green spaces, fixing roads, and installing better lighting in problem areas.  Mayor 
Ortiz was reelected and, after many community forums, in 2004 community members 
started developing the Municipal Policy for the Prevention and Citizen Security.  The 
Policy’s main goal was homicide reduction and implementation began in 2005.  In 
2006, the Observatory for the Prevention of Crime was founded to map locations 
where crime occurs frequently so the police can target those areas through preventive 
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patrolling.  The patrolling was undertaken through joint patrols with both the PNC 
and the municipal police, which was under the Mayor’s offices direct control.   
Joint patrolling enabled community policing because the community already 
knew some of the officers, and theoretically reduced corruption because the two 
policing services were able to check each other.  The Mayors reforms continued, and 
in 2008 a municipal management system was started.  This system brought together 
all levels of government; municipal, state and federal to coordinate violence reduction 
and was subsequently updated in 2009.173  Although crime has not disappeared from 
Santa Tecla, homicides decreased there in 2007 and 2008 while they increased 
dramatically throughout the rest of the country.  This success enabled them to seek 
outside funding and donations, for example from the UN, so as to expand their 
program and become less reliant on unpredictable Salvadoran government funding.  
Various groups have highlighted the Santa Tecla example as a successful and 
innovative approach to policing, most recently in the OAS’ “Scenarios for the Drug 
Problem in the Americas” report, where they also note the “significant” reduction in 
homicide rates.174 
 Recently, El Salvador has undertaken some innovative steps to reduce the 
violence which has plagued the country since the end of the civil war, most notably 
the aforementioned attempts at community policing and the truce which was brokered 
between the two largest gangs over the past year.  Although it is impossible to judge 
whether or not community policing has helped with the reduction of violence, the 
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Santa Tecla case seems to prove that community oriented policing can fight crime if 
the efforts are integrated at all levels of government and with the community.  Other 
authors say that a trusted nonprofit or NGO is necessary to broker between the police 
and the people, but this case seems to prove that trusted members of the government 
can also enable change.  In this example, both members of the government and 
members of the police gave up substantial amounts of decision-making power to the 
community.   
In Santa Tecla they used virtually all elements of community oriented 
policing: community councils and input so they knew what the people cared about, 
foot patrols by police officers who were familiar, focusing on intelligence led 
policing, and working with other entities such as schools, and they appear to be 
succeeding.   This case also proves that a high level of police, government and 
community commitment is necessary for community policing to succeed.  Overall, 
Santa Tecla is the closest to example discussed to achieving community policing as 
explained in the third level of my typology, because it does seem that they are 
attempting a full cultural shift, and not a purely strategic shift.   
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Chapter 4:  Conclusion 
 
 As discussed throughout this thesis, a nation’s police service is inextricably 
linked with overall state legitimacy both because they are supposed to enforce the 
laws and because they are one of the most visible representatives of the state.   
Unfortunately, the police in many Latin American nations (particularly if one 
excludes Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica) is distrusted by the majority of the 
population and this generally delegitimizes the state.  People do not trust their police 
because they are widely perceived as violent and corrupt, and, as discussed in the case 
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studies in the previous chapter, this perception has a strong base in reality.  In 
addition, the police are perceived as inefficient and incompetent.  Consequently many 
people do not report crimes, and this has led to the infamous cifra negra in Latin 
America, where the majority of crimes go unreported.   
This situation has led to various attempts at police reform, from the local to 
the federal level.  This trend began in earnest in the early 1990’s after most states in 
the region became democratic.  One of the most popular policing reforms of the past 
twenty years has been to adopt community oriented policing rhetoric and strategies.  
As discussed in the second chapter, community oriented policing is one of the most 
internationally popular forms of policing, and virtually all governments claim that 
their police work with and for the community; however, it does not have a formal 
definition.  I argued that community oriented policing should include both strategies, 
such as block-by block policing and community security councils, as well as a 
fundamental philosophical shift where the police view themselves as an integral part 
of the community and vice versa.   
In theory, if a nation or city achieves a high level of community-police trust, 
as should occur with community oriented policing, then more crimes should be 
solved because of better intelligence, the police are less likely to abuse people 
because they know them and know that they will be held accountable, and people will 
be more likely to report crimes.  All of these are issues in Latin America, which is 
why community oriented policing reform has been attempted many times throughout 
the region and funded by various governments and donor organizations.   
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In my typology I tried to organize community oriented policing strategies by 
costliness to the police to evaluate a police department’s level of commitment to 
community oriented policing.   I defined costliness as the amount of power that the 
police was willing to renounce to the community.  In my case study chapter I 
subsequently found that, as I suspected, the more costly the step, the less likely it was 
to succeed.  For example, all the police services in the case studies attempted block-
by block policing and creating community councils, which can be relatively less 
costly steps; however, more costly steps such as genuine evaluation performed by an 
outside body and reducing the use of force, were rarely implemented.   
The case studies also demonstrated the many issues a government can 
encounter with implementing police reform, and particularly with implementing 
community oriented policing reform.  Some of the most common issues were: lack of 
political commitment (as in Mexico), difficulties with reducing the use of force (as in 
Brazil), lack of community involvement (everywhere, but particularly notable in 
Chile), issues with granting greater police autonomy because higher ranking officers 
oppose it (everywhere, particularly notable in the initial Colombia example), and, of 
course, issues with evaluation.  This last one was skipped or barely implemented in 
all cases except for in Belo Horizonte and Santa Tecla.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, Santa Tecla comes closest to achieving 
community oriented policing as discussed in my typology because there appears to be 
full community, government and police involvement.  This case also does not 
conform to the belief that community oriented policing has a minimal impact on 
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crime because the town registered a noticeable drop in crime while the rest of El 
Salvador experienced a rise in crime.  Santa Tecla also demonstrates how important 
high-level, continuous, political support is because the impetus for the changes came 
from a reformist mayor.  Lack of political support caused many other community 
oriented policing programs in other locations to collapse.  In addition, the mayor 
successfully engaged other parts of the government and civil society members in 
Santa Tecla, such as the school system, and this contributed to their success.  This 
proven success led to international attention, and funding from the UN, which both 
granted legitimacy and allowed them to expand the program.  Because of its’ success, 
Santa Tecla makes a strong argument for community oriented policing as a successful 
alternative to a heavily militarized policing strategy, which is what El Salvador had 
experimented with previously.     
Using Santa Tecla as the ideal model could help one when creating a strategy 
for a government or police department that wants to implement COP.  The case 
demonstrates how important including members of the government, the police, and 
civil society when creating a COP program is.  Involving these various sectors from 
beginning enables one to create a stronger program because it gives each of these 
sectors a stake in the programs success, and allows for greater community 
involvement from the beginning so people can voice their potential concerns and 
suggestions.  One could also hope that this would mitigate the effects of a political 
regime change because the other sectors could keep pressing for the ongoing reforms.   
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Once designed, a successful program should include various COP strategies 
such as maintaining the same police in the same area, granting the police on the street 
greater discretion, mapping crimes, hosting citizen forums to understand the 
community’s concerns, and emphasizing crime prevention instead of repression.  This 
requires changing the way in which police are trained, to instill respect for human 
rights, the law and for working with the community to solve issues.  Training the 
police through a university, in addition to the academy, also seems to be effective 
because it enables police officers to learn from and interact with civilians.  In addition 
it may require working with an outside group so as to accurately map crimes.  
Regarding the citizen forums, perhaps incentives could be offered so as to encourage 
people to join, and to continue attending.   
The Santa Tecla case also shows that COP programs are more successful 
when police reform occurs alongside other programs, such as the incentives to keep 
young people in school and volunteering in the community.  This both prevents 
youths from perpetrating crimes and gives them greater pride in their community.  
Utilizing financial incentives was clearly successful in encouraging young people to 
join the programs, and could help overcome issues with youth enrollment such as 
those in Minas Gerais.  The early exposure to a non-abusive and corrupt police force 
will hopefully create a generation which is not afraid of the police and who will 
report crimes and assist with providing information that could solve crimes.  This 
constitutes a cultural shift, from one of fearing the police to one of respecting and 
assisting the police, and such a shift will clearly take time.  The successful experiment 
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in Santa Tecla has been ongoing for over a decade, and so perhaps this is a good 
metric to estimate the amount of time police reform can take.     
Lastly, a successful COP program must include evaluation mechanisms to 
ascertain which programs work and which ones do not.   As discussed earlier they 
should perform studies to measure the: (1) impact on the reduction of crime and 
violence (2) perception of citizen insecurity (3) levels of police violence and 
corruption (4) levels of trust/distrust between community and police (5) expansion 
and continuity of the programs (6) collaboration with other bureaucratic agencies and 
(7) the level of community participation in COP programs.  These studies would 
preferably be performed by an outside agency that does not have a stake in the 
answers so as to improve their credibility and validity.  The studies should allow a 
police department to decide which programs need to be improved, strengthened or 
ended.   
The 2010 Colombian Plan closely mirrors the strategy outlined above, and, if 
it is successfully implemented, it may reach a high level of community oriented 
policing in the parts of the nation with state presence.  However, as noticed in some 
of the other case studies, an excellent Plan and good intentions do not necessarily lead 
to reform, unless long-term commitment comes from many parties including from the 
community itself.  Because Colombia’s citizens appear to trust their police more than 
most other Latin Americans already, community involvement may be easier to 
achieve.  I noted that this will only work in the parts of Colombia that already have 
state presence; many parts of the state still lack effective government presence 
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because they remain under guerrilla or paramilitary control.  Once these areas are 
retaken, installing a functioning police force will be one of the first steps that the 
government will take to ensure law and order and political legitimacy.  This is typical 
of all counterinsurgency strategies because the police are necessary for enforcing the 
state’s laws and they are strongly identified with state presence.175   
Overall, I do think that implementing community policing strategies in Latin 
America should improve policing in the region.  In all the case studies (except for in 
the DF), polls showed that the people did trust the community police more than the 
regular police, even if they did not think they had an impact on crime.  Trust 
development and the perception of being more secure are almost as important as 
actual security because it legitimizes the state and means that people are more likely 
to report crimes to the police and assist them with investigations.  As noted in the 
case of Santa Tecla it can also eventually contribute to greater security, instead of just 
the perception.  Consequently I think that states should continue pursuing community 
oriented policing reforms and should try to spread them further geographically.  
Additionally, community oriented police are usually less corrupt and abusive than 
non-community oriented police, and this could be helpful in Latin America where 
police abuse remains a major issue.  In addition, although community oriented police 
still have problems reaching poorer segments of the population they seem to have less 
difficulties than other police, perhaps because they are less abusive and because 
keeping the same police in one area forces them to interact with the community.  One 
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example of this might be the UPP in Sao Paulo, although their overall success cannot 
be judged yet, particularly because they have yet to spread to many of the cities 
favelas.   
Although community oriented policing remains in usage throughout the 
United States and parts of Europe; in many places it has combined with “problem 
oriented policing,” to form yet another strategic shift.  Problem oriented policing 
(POP) calls for an even greater emphasis on preventive policing, police discretion, 
and on less reliance on the criminal justice sector and more on social service and civil 
society agencies.  According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Problem Oriented 
Policing Center, problem oriented policing is compatible with community oriented 
policing because both require the, “systematic use of partnerships and problem-
solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to 
public-safety issues such as crime.”176  As this becomes a more common part of the 
dialogue in policing it will surely spread to Latin America as well; however, this new 
itineration demonstrates the general consensus that community involvement, 
preventive policing, and police discretion are key to good democratic policing and 
consequently I do not think that this shift devalues the importance of the community 
oriented policing fundamentals.   
In conclusion, although community oriented policing may be imperfect, it is a 
major improvement over the militarized policing model that existed in Latin America 
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previously.  Implementing it, as with all reforms, takes time and commitment; 
however, when done well it does appear to enhance both human security and state 
legitimacy.   
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